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THE STATUS OF TRESPASSERS ON LAND
James A. Henderson, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
Shortly after Rowland v. Christian held that possessors of land
owe all entrants, including trespassers, a unitary standard of
reasonable care,' I published a sharp critique of the decision.2 I did
not argue that all trespassers are undeserving or that the general
standard of reasonable care is unworkable. After all, even the pre-
Rowland regime identified circumstances in which possessors owed
trespassers duties of care,' and the reasonableness standard works
in many other negligence contexts.4 Instead, I complained of the
fact that the California Supreme Court did not make a sufficiently
clean break with the traditional idea that possessors owe
* Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell University.
1. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968). The California
Supreme Court referred to the formal categories of entrants to land as "contrary
to our modem social mores and humanitarian values. [These categories]
obscure rather than illuminate the proper considerations which should govern
determination of the question of duty." Id.
2. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept:
Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 512-14 (1976).
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 333-39 (1965) (recognizing
three types of trespassers-constant trespassers, known trespassers, and
trespassing children-that are exceptions to section 333's general rule that
possessors of land owe no duty of reasonable care to trespassers).
4. For example, the reasonableness standard works well in those cases
involving
the individual conduct of "the man in the street" in his arm's length
relations with others in the society .... Given the nontechnical
nature of... these cases, the moralistic, flesh-and-blood qualities of
the reasonable man have provided an adequate vehicle with which to
bring a semblance of order to the task of addressing the polycentric
question of what modes of conduct individual members of society have
a right to expect from one another.
Henderson, supra note 2, at 478; see also id. at 478-82 (discussing how courts
have managed the negligence concept by relying on the reasonable-man test
and the lay jury); cf James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of
Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1534 (1973) ("But courts are not suited to the task of
establishing specific product safety standards in the course of applying general
reasonableness tests to determine the adequacy of allegedly defective products
brought before them.").
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trespassers little or nothing by way of investments in care.' I
argued that as long as courts were going to continue to attach
normative weight to a plaintiffs status as trespasser, they would
need a rule structure to support adjudication of the defendant-
possessor's duty of care.6 Thus, if the Rowland court had simply
held that possessors owe all trespassers a duty of reasonable care, I
would not have objected on legal-process grounds.7 But the court
went on to say that triers of fact could continue to weigh the status
of trespasser-plaintiffs in determining whether they were entitled to
recover.8 Thus, by attempting to have it both ways-by purporting
to abandon the formal categories of entrants but continuing to allow
their status to be taken into account informally-Rowland gave trial
courts a roving commission to deal with trespasser-plaintiffs in a
discretionary, essentially lawless fashion.
At the end of my article criticizing Rowland, which clearly ran
against a strong tide of scholarly praise for the decision, 9 I predicted
that Rowland and a number of other then-recent decisions greatly
increasing the power of judges and juries to use their discretion to
5. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 512-13.
6. See id. at 511-13 ("As long as society continued to view the relationship
between land possessor and entrant as deserving of special consideration, the
formal rules governing possessors' liability were a necessary prerequisite to the
adjudicability of negligence cases involving the plaintiffs entry on
land .... Purporting as it does to retain the substance of the prior law, while
abandoning its form, the [Rowland] decision epitomizes what I have
characterized as the retreat from the rule of law." (footnote call numbers
omitted)).
7. See id. at 512 ("Certainly there would be little basis for objection on
process grounds if the California court in Rowland had concluded that the
'modern social mores and humanitarian values' to which it refers have
progressed to the point that the relationships between possessors and entrants
are no longer special-i.e., are no different from the relationships which
generally obtain between strangers in our society acting at arm's length.").
8. See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) ("The proper
test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land ... is whether in the
management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the
probability of injury to others, and ... the plaintiffs status as a trespasser,
licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status have
some bearing on the question of liability. .. ").
9. See, e.g., Edmund Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Business
Premises-One Step Beyond Rowland and Greenman, 22 UCLA L. REV. 820,
822-23 (1975); Thomas A. Daily, Recent Case, Invitee, Licensee, Trespasser
Distinction Abolished in California, 23 ARK. L. REV. 153, 156 (1969); Carl E.
Edwards, Jr. & Richard J. Jerome, Comment, Premises Liability: The
Foreseeable Emergence of the Community Standard-Mile High Fence Co. v.
Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971), 51 DENV. L.J. 145, 155-57 (1974);
Peter J. Homer, Jr., Comment, A Re-examination of the Land Possessor's Duty
to Trespassers, Licensees, and Invitees, 14 S.D. L. REV. 332, 346--48 (1969);
Comment, Occupier of Land Held to Owe Duty of Ordinary Care to All
Entrants-"Invitee," "Licensee," and "Trespasser" Distinctions Abolished:
Rowland v. Christian (Cal. 1968), 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 426, 426-29 (1969).
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"do the right thing" would not stand the test of time. '° As the
Reporters' Note to section 51 of the proposed Restatement (Third) of
Torts indicates, my prediction has essentially proved accurate." Of
states that have considered the issue of trespasser entrants, only a
minority have adopted a unitary standard of reasonable care. 2
Rather than accept the roving commission that Rowland tried to
thrust upon them, a majority of courts have retained the traditional
rule structures governing the duties owed to trespassers.
13
My purpose in this Article is not simply to say "I told you so."
Instead, I aim to criticize the new Restatement (Third)'s reliance in
section 52 on the concept of "flagrant trespasser"4 on essentially the
same ground that I criticized Rowland more than three decades ago.
As I will explain, the modifier "flagrant" in this context conveys a
sense that those trespassers are undeserving of being treated
reasonably. On this view, the drafters are saying essentially the
same thing that Rowland said-the fact that a plaintiff-entrant is
an unprivileged trespasser may tip the balance normatively in favor
of the defendant-possessor, depending on whether the judge or jury
in its discretion think it is appropriate. I realize that section 52 and
its comments may be read as conceding that a more formal rule
structure regarding trespassers will be needed eventually and that
the phrase "flagrant trespasser" acts as a place saver until the
various state courts work out their own formal solutions." But
10. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 525 ("Once the negligence-under-all-
the-circumstances lottery is seen for what it is, the expense and inefficiency
associated with it will make a wide range of alternatives socially attractive.").
11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 51 reporters' note cmt. a, tbl. (Council Draft No. 8, 2008).
12. In addition to California, only Alaska, Hawaii, Louisiana, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, and New York maintain a truly unitary standard,
and the Louisiana courts have left open the question of what standard to apply
to criminal trespassers. Id. Although the Colorado courts attempted to adopt a
unitary standard, the Colorado legislature restored a status-based system in
1990. Id.
13. Forty-two jurisdictions currently apply the traditional trespasser-rule
structures with minor variations. See id. Counted among them are the District
of Columbia and the sixteen states that have one standard for all
nontrespassers to land and another standard for trespassers. Id. Although the
section 52 comments classify these jurisdictions as applying a unitary standard
that excludes trespassers, a standard that treats different entrants to land with
different standards of care can hardly be said to be "unitary." See id. Finally,
New Jersey applies a "hybrid" system that does not clearly fall within either a
traditional system or a unitary system. Id.
14. See id. § 52.
15. See id. § 52 cmt. a ("This Chapter... does not attempt to define
flagrant trespassers or prescribe the precise line on the continuum that
distinguishes ordinary trespassers from flagrant trespassers.... [because]
some jurisdictions may prefer bright-line rules that are more certain of
application and therefore more easily administered than case-by-case
determinations based on all of the circumstances.").
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section 52 may also be read as a proposed end solution. 16 On either
reading, the concept of flagrant trespassers is inadequate, either as
a solution to be applied by triers of fact on a case-by-case basis or as
a guide for future lawmaking.
WHY THE FLAGRANT-TRESPASSER CONCEPT IS INADEQUATE
As the comments to section 52 recognize, the phrase at issue
suggests a spectrum from mild and "ordinary" trespassers to
egregious and "flagrant" trespassers. 17  Individual trespassers in
particular cases are to be located on the spectrum according to the
degree to which their entry invades the possessor's right to exclusive
possession.18 And yet the concept of trespass admits of no such
differentiation by degree. Putting questions of privileges aside
(which, by the way, are traditionally resolved by rule structures 9),
the very idea of an entrant knowingly coming onto the land of
another necessarily implies a willful invasion of, and implicit
disrespect for, the possessor's right to exclusive possession. 20 Like
being pregnant, that core aspect of being a trespasser is not a
matter of degree. Stated a bit differently, there is no such thing as
an unprivileged trespass that does not implicitly reflect disrespect
for the possessor's right to possession. Thus, whenever an
unprivileged trespasser knowingly crosses a boundary, he has
invaded the possessor's right to possession regardless of the fact that
he intends to do no harm while he is there.
To be sure, the different question of whether an unpermitted
entrant is otherwise privileged to enter does provide a basis for
distinguishing among trespasser-entrants. When necessity forces
an actor to trespass to save his life, for example, crossing the
boundary does not necessarily reflect disrespect for the possessor's
right to possess. 2' And aside from the question of privilege, the
16. See id. ("Others may prefer to adopt more general standards that allow
the fact finder to take into account all of the facts and circumstances of the case
to make a more just determination.").
17. See id.
18. See id. ("[Tihis Section .... leaves to each jurisdiction employing the
concept to determine the point along the spectrum of trespassory conduct at
which a trespasser is a 'flagrant' rather than an 'ordinary' trespasser.... The
idea behind distinguishing particularly egregious trespassers for different
treatment is that their presence on another's land is so antithetical to the rights
of the land possessor to exclusive use and possession .... ).
19. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 196-97 (1965) (dealing
with public and private necessity to enter land).
20. But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 52 cmt. a (Council Draft No. 8, 2008).
21. For example, a person who trespasses onto land merely to admire a
beautiful view invades the land possessor's exclusive right to possess the land.
This trespasser reflects some very minimal level of moral turpitude insofar as
he intends to trespass, but not much. That said, his action is not socially
desirable and reflects obvious disrespect for the land possessor's exclusive right
1074 [Vol. 44
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question of what a trespasser does (or plans to do) while on the land
may suggest different answers to the question of whether it is fair to
impose on the possessor a duty of reasonable care.22 One who
trespasses onto occupied property in order to harm the possessor or
his property, in my opinion, deserves, from a moral perspective, less
protection than one entering obviously vacant land for a brief time
merely to admire the scenery.23 But the trespass, as such, as it
relates to the possessor's right to exclusive possession, as such, is the
same in either instance and does not depend on the entrant's
attitude toward the entry. Thus, the entrant who trespasses to
admire the scenery may have utter contempt for the notion that the
possessor has the power to bar the entry, and the entrant intent on
harming the possessor may regret very much the necessity of
entering the property in order to inflict personal injury. But neither
entrant has sufficient respect for the other's right to possession to
deter him from crossing the boundary.
Thus, to assert that the trespass itself is more flagrant in the
case of the "bad-guy" trespasser is simply not accurate. What the
drafters must be read as intending is that the "bad-guy" trespasser
is less morally deserving of protection for reasons other than the
boundary crossing as such.24  However, to make that admission
reveals the essentially discretionary (and I would argue, lawless)
nature of the delegation of judicial authority. Under such a regime,
judges and juries would be free to decide on whim whether they feel
that a particular trespasser is, all things considered, deserving of
due care.
of possession as it is wholly gratuitous-there are market alternatives, and the
trespasser could have simply obtained the land possessor's permission to enter
the land. In contrast, one who enters land to save his or her life in the face of a
large storm by, for example, huddling behind a stone wall, does not reflect this
same level of disrespect. This entry to land is not gratuitous and has no market
alternatives but is driven by necessity. In fact, if given the opportunity, the
entrant to land would undoubtedly pay for the right to enter the land and stay
alive.
22. Comment a to section 52 suggests that intent of the trespasser may be
one way to distinguish between flagrant and ordinary trespassers. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 52
cmt. a (Council Draft No. 8, 2008) ("A somewhat broader rule might extend the
definition of flagrant trespasser to those who enter the land with a malicious
motive or who commit an intentional wrong to the land possessor or the
possessor's family or property while on the land, in addition to those who
commit crimes."). But measuring a trespasser's intent presents a whole host of
its own problems. For example, how would section 52 treat the trespasser who
enters land with the intent to commit a crime but then has a change of heart,
turns around to leave, and just before exiting the land injures himself?
Further, how can courts prove malicious motive or lack thereof?
23. See id. § 52 cmt. a, illus. 1-2 (noting that the trespasser who trespasses
onto property to harm the possessor is a flagrant trespasser and the trespasser
who enters vacant land to admire its scenery is an ordinary trespasser).
24. See id. § 52 cmt. a.
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It will be observed that the notion of flagrant trespasser, as the
drafters use it, is essentially a noninstrumental, fairness-based
norm. Comment a to section 52 says it would be "unfair" to allow
"bad-guy" trespassers to insist on reasonable care;" comment h says
it would be "unjust."26  I do not quarrel with these assertions.
Instead, what I find puzzling is that section 52(b) recognizes an
exception to these fairness norms for helpless, flagrant trespassers
on a ground that seems entirely efficiency based.27  Thus, even
though the "bad-guy" trespasser does not morally deserve protection
because of what may be his deplorable motives for coming onto the
property in the first place, under section 52(b) he suddenly becomes
deserving of protection when, to the possessor's knowledge, he
becomes helplessly imperiled.28  I have trouble following this logic.
Under the traditional approach, the basic norm that possessors do
not owe trespassers a duty of reasonable care seems to be based, at
least in part, on the inefficiency of requiring a possessor to protect
difficult-to-foresee entrants who could protect themselves at a much
lower cost simply by not trespassing.29 In that context, one can
easily recognize the special circumstances where exceptions to the
general rule are justifiable as least-cost solutions. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts identifies those circumstances. ° But under the
flagrant-trespasser regime, where the no-duty rule is clearly rooted
noninstrumentally in principles of fairness and justice 2  an
efficiency-based override is puzzling. At the very least, a comment
to section 52(b) ought to recognize these implications and deal with
them straightforwardly. Thus, not only is section 52's concept of
flagrancy inappropriate as a means of distinguishing among morally
deserving and undeserving trespassers, but section 52(b) introduces
further confusion by invoking a helpless-trespasser override that
seems clearly to be based on instrumental, efficiency grounds.32
25. Id. ("The policy justifying the lesser duty owed to flagrant trespassers is
protection of the rights of private-property owners, which would be unfairly
diminished if possessors are subject to liability to flagrant trespassers based on
ordinary negligence." (emphasis added)).
26. Id. § 52 cmt. h ("[The limited duty to flagrant trespassers] is based on
the principle that it would be unjust to require a negligent land possessor to
compensate a person whose presence on the land was flagrantly offensive to the
rights of the possessor." (emphasis added)).
27. See id. § 52(b).
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 176 (7th ed.
2007) (explaining that a possessor of land has no duty to trespassers because
trespassers can prevent their injuries at a lower cost by simply not trespassing).
30. See supra note 3.
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 52 cmt. a (Council Draft No. 8, 2008).
32. See id. § 52(b) ("Notwithstanding Subsection (a), a land possessor has a
duty to exercise reasonable care for flagrant trespassers who reasonably appear
to be: 1) imperiled; and 2) helpless or unable to protect themselves."). The
imperiled trespasser is no less flagrant simply because he or she is imperiled
1076 [Vol. 44
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According to section 52(b), even morally undeserving trespassers
somehow become morally deserving when, through no fault of the
possessor, they really need help.
What would I recommend in place of the flagrant-trespasser
concept? Assuming that the ALI does not want to return to the
traditional, pre-Rowland approach of formally recognizing specific
categories of deserving trespassers,33 and also assuming that an
across-the-board unitary reasonableness standard is unacceptable,
34
I would suggest two modifications. First, I would replace the
modifier "flagrant" with a word such as "undeserving" or
"reprehensible." These adjectives more candidly signal that it is not
the entry without permission, as such, that is different from one
case to the next, but rather the moral standing of any given
trespasser to insist that the possessor invest in precautions on his
behalf. An earlier draft of these provisions used "culpable" in place
of "flagrant."35 I would have preferred that term over "flagrant," but
my suggested terms carry, more straightforwardly than even
"culpable," the idea that some trespassers do deserve protection
36from the possessor. In any event, terms such as "culpable" or
"reprehensible" evoke notions of moral fault-employing either of
these modifiers in place of "flagrant," which functions more as a
factual description of the trespasser's conduct rather than a
normative one, would make it clear that some further rule structure
is necessary if trial courts are to sort out these cases fairly and
and helpless. And likewise, assuming the land possessor did not wantonly or
intentionally cause the trespasser's imperiled state in the first place, the
trespasser is no more wanton or intentional simply because he or she becomes
imperiled and helpless. Thus, the duty imposed by section 52(b) seems to be
only loosely based on fairness.
33. See id. ch. 9 reporters' memorandum ("[Wie have opted for what we
think is the better approach, a unitary standard .... "); cf supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM ch. 9 reporters' memorandum (Council Draft No. 8, 2008) ("We have
attempted to accommodate [the] conflict [between tort and property principles]
in § 52, which carves out a class of trespassers-those whose trespass [are] in
flagrant disregard of the land possessor's right of exclusive control-and
provided a lesser duty owed to those trespassers.").
35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYsIcAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 51(a) (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 2007) ("A culpable trespasser is a
trespasser on land possessed by another whose entrance on the land is
sufficiently egregious to be antithetical to the rights of the land possessor to
exclusive possession and control of the land such that the land possessor should
not be subject to liability for failing to exercise the ordinary duty of care owed
others present on the land.").
36. See id. ch. 9 reporters' memorandum ("A critical distinction. .. is
between 'benign trespassers' and 'culpable trespassers.' The idea is that there
are some trespassers whose presence on the land is so offensive to the rights of
the land possessor that the land possessor should not be required to compensate
the trespasser .... Some trespassers are not of this ilk, and this Chapter adopts
a duty of reasonable care as to them." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
2009] 1077
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consistently, within the rule of law, as I articulated in my law
37
review piece thirty years ago.
My second suggestion would be to supply the necessary rule
structure, either by providing clearer guidelines for state lawmakers
to follow in building such a structure, or by setting out the preferred
structure, leaving courts free to adjust it over time. The proposed
comments and illustrations to section 52 reveal the contours of some
of the more important elements of such an "undeserving trespasser"
structure.8 I do not believe that the drafting problems would be
enormous or insurmountable.
CONCLUSION
The current draft of section 52 of the Restatement (Third)
asserts that unprivileged trespassers may be located on a spectrum
from "ordinary" to "flagrant" on the basis of the extent or degree of
their invasion of the possessor's right to exclusive possession. I do
not think this works. All trespassers invade the right to possession
to the same extent by entering without permission; the difference
between them and privileged entrants is a difference in kind, not
degree. What the drafters really want is to give trial courts
discretion to treat unprivileged trespassers differently based on
differences regarding why those trespassers came onto the land-
morally relevant differences that entitle some trespassers, but not
others, to insist that possessors invest resources to protect them
from harm. Thus, I would replace the term "flagrant" with
"undeserving" or "reprehensible." Moreover, as I explained thirty
years ago, some sort of rule structure will be necessary to support
trial courts' efforts to distinguish among unprivileged trespassers.
Granting that the Restatement (Third) provides the beginnings of
such a structure, I would have preferred that it supply lawmakers
with clearer guildelines, or at least employ terminology that leaves
no doubt as to the real basis upon which such distinctions should be
made.
37. See Henderson, supra note 2, at 468-69.
38. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 52 cmt. a & illus. 1-2 (Council Draft No. 8, 2008) ("A specific rule
might... providle] that a flagrant trespasser is one who commits a crime of a
certain severity while entering or upon the land. A somewhat broader rule
might extend the definition of flagrant trespasser to those who enter the land
with a malicious motive or who commit an intentional wrong to the land
possessor.., while on the land, in addition to those who commit crimes.").
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